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Foreword
Th is paper is intended as a primer for policymakers on lessons learned from decades of 
experience with the federal system of higher education accreditation. It streamlines, updates 
and expands ACTA’s 2002 investigation, Can College Accreditation Live Up to Its Promise?1 At 
that time we found that accreditation did not ensure quality, was not protecting the curricu-
lum from serious degradation, and was giving students, parents, and public decision-makers 
almost no useful information about institutions of higher education.
Our new investigation fi nds that things have only become worse. Recent stories abound—
illustrated in “Stories from the Front Lines”—about the ills visited upon schools by accredi-
tors, and about lapses in academic programs that accreditation has failed to prevent. Accredi-
tation is giving students and parents a false sense of confi dence that certifi ed schools have 
passed a meaningful test when they have not. 
Today, accreditation is bad education policy that undermines the autonomy of our educa-
tional institutions while doing nothing to ensure academic quality. Congress rightly wants to 
ensure that federal student aid funds do not go to “fl y by night” operations. But there are other 
and better ways to achieve that result—at less cost and with less damage to higher education. 
In the following pages, we outline “Why Accreditation Doesn’t Work” and “What Policymak-
ers Can Do” to fi x the accreditation system now. 
Anne D. Neal
President 
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STORIES FROM THE FRONT LINES
STORIES FROM THE FRONT LINES
A Travesty Accreditation Failed to Prevent
Missouri State University student Emily Brooker had no idea what an uproar she was about to 
cause. Th e School of Social Work student objected in the fall of 2005 about a letter she’d been 
asked to sign at school. Th e letter endorsed a matter of public policy with which she did not 
agree, and she thought that being asked to sign it—by a professor no less—was inappropri-
ate. What’s worse, when Booker refused, she was accused of violating tenets of the social work 
program’s “Standards and Essential Functions for Social Work Education” relating to diversity, 
interpersonal skills, and professional behavior and subjected to a two-hour disciplinary hear-
ing. Faculty ordered her to write a paper describing how she would “lessen the gap” between 
her personal beliefs and what professional ethics purportedly required. She was also required 
to sign a special contract in order to continue in the program.2
Aft er Brooker fi led a federal civil-rights lawsuit, senior MSU administrators became aware 
of the matter and called for an external review. Investigators found evidence of “bullying” 
toward students and deemed the overall learning environment “toxic.”3 Th e review also said: 
Many students and faculty stated a fear of  voicing differing opinions from the 
instructor or colleague.
It appears that faculty have no history of  intellectual discussion/debate. 
Rather, differing opinions are taken personally and often result in inappropri-
ate discourse.
There is an atmosphere where the Code of  Ethics is used in order to coerce 
students into certain belief  systems regarding social work practice and the 
social work profession. This represents a distorted use of  the Social Work 
Code of  Ethics in that the Code of  Ethics articulates that social workers 
should respect the values and beliefs of  others.4
MSU’s president said that the review documented “as negative a review of an academic 
program as I have ever seen.”5 He put all tenure and hiring decisions for the school on hold 
and speculated that an impending accrediting review might have to be delayed as, one news-
paper reported, “the school couldn’t earn [it] in its current state.”6
What he did not say was more troubling, however. MSU is accredited not by one, but by 
two accrediting associations. North Central accredited the institution as a whole in 2005. 
Meanwhile, the MSU School of Social Work has programmatic accreditation from the Council 
on Social Work Education (CSWE). Far from solving the problem, accreditors were part of it. 
CSWE in fact requires all accredited programs to ensure that students “understand the forms 
and mechanisms of oppression and discrimination and apply strategies of advocacy and social 
change that advance social and economic justice.”7 According to CSWE standards, MSU’s 
School of Social Work was doing its job. Th is is just one of many cases across the country 
where an accrediting agency’s politicized perspective is corrupting education. 
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STORIES FROM THE FRONT LINES
A Teaching Accreditor Run Amok
Th e National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education (NCATE) demands that schools 
of education assess the “dispositions,” or opinions, of teacher trainees as a requirement for 
accreditation. Until just recently, according to these standards, “dispositions” were “guided by 
beliefs and attitudes related to values such as caring, fairness, honesty, responsibility and social 
justice.” Taking the lead from their accreditor, education schools across the country adopted 
criteria assessing students’ acumen in “social justice” and “diversity.” Th e Penn State College 
of Education, for example aims to “[e]nhance the commitment of faculty, staff  and students 
to the centrality of diversity, social justice, and democratic citizenship.”8 Adelphi University’s 
NCATE-accredited Education School states on its website that:
Social justice as a core value is reflected in the basic social and philosophical 
courses offered to our students. At a time when many schools of  education have 
eliminated these disciplines, we remain steadfast in engaging students in dialogue 
about the economic, social, political, gender, and ethnic inequalities that exist in 
today’s society….We teach students to challenge the conventional ways of  think-
ing about mathematics, science, history, English, and language arts.…Students 
who are imaginative and empowered become teachers keenly aware of  the social 
injustices of  our world, willing to explore ways to alleviate those inequalities.9
Aspiring teachers were bearing the consequences. In a story reported in the New York Sun, 
students at Brooklyn College expressed fears that the NCATE guidelines were being used 
against those who did not share the political views of their professors. Several students com-
plained they were penalized in a course on high school literacy when they sought to challenge 
the professor’s assertion that grammatical English was the language of oppressors.10 A similar 
problem occurred at Washington State University, where education student Ed Swan was 
threatened with dismissal for expressing his beliefs on topics such as gun control and reli-
gion—aft er being asked to do so. Swan was said to have violated “dispositions” criteria relat-
ing to “appreciat[ing] and valu[ing] human diversity,” sensitivity to “community and cultural 
norms,” and respecting “others’ varied talents and perspectives.”11
In light of these abusive practices, a number of organizations—including the American 
Council of Trustees and Alumni—opposed federal recognition of NCATE by the Secretary of 
Education. NCATE agreed to drop the “social justice” wording from its standards, and its sta-
tus as an accreditor was renewed. But the amorphous term “professional dispositions” is still 
used, and many NCATE-accredited schools of education retain a “social justice” requirement. 
In light of the documented national shortage of teachers with the knowledge and skills to 
provide solid K-12 education, NCATE’s actions are troublesome. In practice, NCATE’s standards 
have been used to ignore academic goals, and lead to a politicized determination of who is quali-
fi ed to be a teacher. 
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STORIES FROM THE FRONT LINES
Who’s in Charge at Auburn?
In numerous cases, accreditors have extended their reach in ways that inappropriately intrude 
upon governance and trustee oversight. Th e Southern Association of Colleges and Schools, for 
example, currently applies its Comprehensive Standards of Institutional Mission, Governance, 
and Eff ectiveness during accreditation reviews. Th ese standards insist that the President—and 
not the board—is in charge when it comes to major pieces of the academic enterprise. SACS’ 
standards vest the institution’s CEO with “ultimate responsibility for and…appropriate admin-
istrative and fi scal control over, the institution’s intercollegiate athletics program…and fund-
raising activities.”12 In shorthand: Board, butt out. 
In a case involving Auburn University, these standards took on real meaning. Th e regional 
accreditor sanctioned the board in 2003 for meddling in administrators’ aff airs and put the 
school on a one-year probation for what Th e Chronicle of Higher Education reported was 
“trustee meddling in the university’s administration and for a lack of commitment to the ac-
creditation process.”13 Th e sanction was lift ed only aft er three outside investigators found no 
basis for the penalty and trustees signed a personal statement of commitment to the accredita-
tion process. While boards of trustees do sometimes overstep and criticism may be called for, 
this intervention raises serious questions: 
Why should federally approved accreditors—who, almost without exception, are university 
administrators and faculty members whose interests may confl ict with those of engaged trust-
ees—have the power to second-guess boards, boards that have the ultimate legal responsibility 
for higher education governance?
Th ere is absolutely no indication that Congress ever intended the system of accreditation 
to reach into areas of governance already controlled by state statute, charters, and bylaws. Nor 
is it clear how governance over intercollegiate athletics has any signifi cant bearing on accredi-
tors’ guarantee of educational quality. As former Senator Hank Brown noted in testimony 
before the U.S. House Education Subcommittee on 21st Century Competitiveness in 2002, 
internal constituencies can manipulate the accrediting process to undermine institutional 
autonomy and self-governance—at the expense of institution-wide priorities and innovation.14 
2
0
0
7
 |
 W
H
Y
 A
C
C
R
E
D
IT
A
T
IO
N
 D
O
E
S
N
’T
 W
O
R
K
 A
N
D
 W
H
A
T
 P
O
L
IC
Y
M
A
K
E
R
S
 C
A
N
 C
O
 A
B
O
U
T
 I
T
W
H
Y
 A
C
C
R
E
D
IT
A
T
IO
N
 D
O
E
S
N
’T
 W
O
R
K
 A
N
D
 W
H
A
T
 P
O
L
IC
Y
M
A
K
E
R
S
 C
A
N
 C
O
 A
B
O
U
T
 I
T
 
4
STORIES FROM THE FRONT LINES
Law School Accreditor’s Illegal Standards?
George Mason law professor David Bernstein just wants the American Bar Association to stop 
pressuring law schools to violate the law.15 Th e ABA accredits America’s 195 law schools and 
last spring it modifi ed its longstanding diversity standards.
For many years, the ABA had required law schools seeking accreditation to show that they 
had made an eff ort to ensure diversity among their student body and faculty. 
Now more stringent standards require schools to “demonstrate by concrete action” that 
they have taken steps to acquire a student body, faculty, and staff  that are “diverse with respect 
to gender, race, and ethnicity.”16 Th e standards skirt legal protections against racial or sexual 
discrimination in part by refusing to specify what concrete actions the ABA expects schools to 
take.
To emphasize the fi rmness of its expectations, the ABA specifi cally warned schools in 
states such as California where voters rejected racial preferences, that even they must fi nd a 
way to comply. According to the ABA’s 2006-2007 Standards for Approval of Law Schools:
The requirement of  a constitutional provision or statute that purports to 
prohibit consideration of  gender, race, ethnicity, or national origin in admis-
sions or employment decisions is not justification for a school’s non-compli-
ance with Standard 212. A law school that is subject to such constitutional or 
statutory provisions would have to demonstrate the commitment required by 
Standard 212 by means other than those prohibited by the applicable consti-
tutional or statutory provisions.17 
In plain English, that means the ABA expects law schools to fi nd unique ways to go around 
the law. Indeed, the Chair of the ABA’s accreditation arm explained the association expects 
schools to start “being more creative in how they promote diversity.”18 
 In the face of the new accreditation criteria, the American Law Deans Association 
balked—and balked loudly: “[T]he accrediting body inappropriately inserts itself into the 
internal aff airs of the institutions it accredits, [they said], and does so in a way that forces 
homogeneity, and conversely stifl es innovation and diversity, among law schools.”19 Other crit-
ics accused the ABA of having “secret standards” for accreditation that the ABA had failed to 
publish.20
Faced with the public outcry, the National Advisory Committee on Institutional Quality 
and Integrity (NACIQI) recommended, and the Secretary of Education has now approved, an 
18-month rather than the standard fi ve-year renewal. Secretary Spellings also is requiring the 
ABA to provide extensive documentation on how it applies its controversial diversity 
standard.21 2
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WHY ACCREDITATION DOESN’T WORK
WHY ACCREDITATION DOESN’T WORK
Accreditation does nothing to ensure educational quality. 
In passing the Higher Education Act, Congress linked accreditation and federal student aid to 
prevent students from squandering money on diploma mills. According to the Act, recognized 
accreditors serve as a “reliable authority” on the “quality of education or training off ered.”22 
Accreditation was thought to be a good proxy for quality. But this assumption was wrong. 
Today, virtually all colleges and universities in the United States are accredited (sometimes 
by more than one accrediting body); yet, there are widespread concerns that college quality 
has been on a steady decline. According to the September 2006 report of the Secretary of Edu-
cation’s Commission on the Future of Higher Education: “Unacceptable numbers of college 
graduates enter the workforce without the skills employers say they need in an economy in 
which…knowledge matters more than ever.”23 
On the rare occasion that accreditors do suspend or terminate an institution’s accredita-
tion, it isn’t due primarily to educational concerns. Typically, institutions are sanctioned 
because of fi nancial shortcomings—an area the Education Department already investigates 
without the need for accreditation teams.24 
All of this leads us to ask: Why is accreditation so ineff ective? 
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WHY ACCREDITATION DOESN’T WORK
Accreditation examines inputs and ignores the output that matters to parents and stu-
dents: educational quality. 
Parents, students, and citizens may assume that accreditation ensures good educational qual-
ity, but quality is not what the process measures. Accreditation only shows that the school is 
following what the accreditors think is the proper formula for a successful educational institu-
tion, not whether an institution is in fact successful at teaching students. 
Th e time-consuming process begins with a self-study. Th e accreditors require an applicant 
institution to submit a lengthy checklist of inputs and procedures: Does the school have a 
mission statement? A faculty senate? How many library books? What are the program review 
procedures? Do professors have “proper” credentials? Is there adequate fi nancing? And disci-
plinary codes? 
Th en a team from the accrediting association, usually composed of faculty and administra-
tors from other accredited institutions within the region, conducts a campus visit. 
Once an institution is accredited, it generally retains the certifi cation for ten years before 
it must seek reaccreditation. If the accreditation agency fi nds weak spots in an institution, it 
almost always allows the school a grace period of a year or two to remedy the problem. 
Nothing in the accreditation process concretely measures student learning, instructional 
quality, or academic standards. Nothing measures whether students have made intellectual 
progress since high school or have attained a level of basic knowledge and competence that 
would be expected of college graduates. If the accrediting process were applied to automobile 
inspection, cars would “pass” as long as they had tires, doors, and an engine—without anyone 
ever turning the key to see if the car actually operated.
8In 1992, the Education Department Inspector General told the House Education and 
Labor Committee that “billions of dollars available to students each year through loans and 
grants are at risk, in part because the recognition process does not assure that the accrediting 
agencies use appropriate and eff ective policies to accredit schools.”25 
Congress amended the Higher Education Act to strengthen the requirements that accredit-
ing agencies had to meet, specifying that accreditors develop standards regarding:
(A)  success with respect to student achievement in relation to the 
 institution’s mission, including, as appropriate, consideration of  course  
 completion, state licensing examinations, and job placement rates  
 [note: this requirement was placed ninth in the 1992 amendments, but  
 moved to first in 1998];
(B)  curricula;
(C)  faculty;
(D)  facilities, equipment and supplies;
(E)  fiscal and administrative capacity as appropriate to the specified scale  
 of  operations;
(F)  student support services;
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WHY ACCREDITATION DOESN’T WORK
(G)  recruiting and admission practices, academic calendars, catalogs, 
 publications, grading and advertising;
(H)  measures of  program length and the objectives of  the degrees or 
 cre dentials offered;
(I)  record of  student complaints received by, or available to, the agency or 
 association;
(J)  record of  compliance with its program responsibilities under this
 subchapter and [the Work Study Program] based on the most recent  
 student loan default rate data provided by the Secretary, the results of   
 financial or compliance audits, program reviews, and such other 
 information as the Secretary may provide…. 26
Th e result of those legal changes, unfortunately, was negligible. 
Rather than requiring some objective verifi cation that a program actually contributed to 
student achievement, the accrediting associations exhorted colleges and universities to devise 
a means of assessing their own “institutional eff ectiveness.” Claiming that mandating certain 
standards of student achievement would violate institutional autonomy, accreditors have al-
lowed schools to satisfy the criteria by merely showing that they have adopted some program 
to assess themselves.
Th e Southern Association’s criteria, for example, call for institutions to have in place a 
“Quality Enhancement Plan” that “focuses on learning outcomes and/or the environment sup-
porting student learning” and also “identifi es goals and a plan to assess their achievement.”27 
Th e Middle States Commission on Higher Education’s standards provide that “assessment of 
student learning is an essential component of the assessment of institutional eff ectiveness.”28 
In other words, a school with low, mediocre, or even eccentric goals could be judged to be of 
acceptable educational quality so long as the school was meeting the goals it set for itself. 
In recent years, the Education Department has raised repeated concerns about declining 
quality under the accreditation regime. Th e Commission on the Future of Higher Education 
found the system of accreditation had “signifi cant shortcomings.” Th e Commission asserted 
that: 
Accreditation reviews are typically kept private, and those that are made pub-
lic still focus on process reviews more than bottom-line results for learning or 
costs. The growing public demand for increased accountability, quality and 
transparency coupled with the changing structure and globalization of  higher 
education requires a transformation of  accreditation.29
Given mounting public concerns, accrediting associations have taken pains to appear 
more attentive to student achievement. Th e Western Association accrediting guidelines, for 
example, provide that “Th e institution’s expectations for learning and student attainment are 
developed and widely shared among its members (including faculty, students, staff , and where 
appropriate, external stakeholders). Th e institution’s faculty takes collective responsibility for 
establishing, reviewing, fostering, and demonstrating the attainment of these expectations.”30 
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WHY ACCREDITATION DOESN’T WORK
In May 2007, WASC submitted a Framework for Evaluating Educational Eff ectiveness to NA-
CIQI that fi nds an institution has made major steps in determining that “[l]earning is demon-
strably achieved” when “results are discussed regularly and deliberatively by all faculty.”31 
However, the diffi  culty with such standards is that schools have a strong incentive to make 
themselves look good, while still off ering the kind of diff use and easy courses that fail to 
educate. And writing new standards that simply admonish colleges and universities to take 
student learning seriously is not likely to bring about any improvement in educational quality. 
Th ere are, of course, ways accreditors could examine the curricular structure to assess 
quality education. But they fail to do so. While accrediting standards call for a strong general 
education, accreditors do not assess whether a school has put in place a rigorous “core cur-
riculum” or whether the curriculum simply consists of a loosely assembled list of distribution 
requirements. At most colleges and universities, the core curriculum exists in name only. Each 
requirement can be satisfi ed by taking one or two courses from a wide smorgasbord of options 
across many departments. Oft en the courses, which are taught by teaching assistants or by the 
most newly minted Ph.D. in the department, can be taken at any time during the undergradu-
ate years. Long gone is the rigorous core curriculum that all students took during their fresh-
man (and sometimes sophomore) years that constituted a shared intellectual experience. 
As a result, even the “minimum standards” that accreditors purport to guarantee are 
far from suffi  cient to ensure that students receive anything worthy of being called a college 
education. 
Colleges and universities simply do not lose their accreditation because of a judgment by 
accreditors that the curriculum is weak, the faculty poor, and the students don’t learn much. 
As David Justice, an administrator at DePaul University, has explained: “Th e truth of the mat-
ter is that regional accrediting associations aren’t very good about sanctioning an institution 
for poor quality.”32 As the accreditors see it, removing an institution’s accredited status is unde-
sirable since it leaves students ineligible for federal student aid and requires a mass exodus to 
other institutions.33  
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WHY ACCREDITATION DOESN’T WORK
Accreditation undermines traditional strengths of American higher education: institu-
tional autonomy and diversity. 
Under the Higher Education Act, accrediting associations develop standards on topics speci-
fi ed by Congress; they are also given free rein to adopt “additional standards not provided 
for.”34 Th us, accreditors are free to impose standards that go beyond those Congress has man-
dated, using their leverage to push institutions toward any agenda they wish. 
While claiming, on the one hand, that assessing student learning would undermine insti-
tutional autonomy and diversity, accreditors have shown no such hesitation when it comes 
to matters of employment, productivity, governance, and trustee oversight. In these areas, 
accreditors have extended their reach, imposing standards that oft en undermine rather than 
enhance educational quality. 
Campbell University in North Carolina was placed on probation because its standard 
faculty teaching load was 15 hours per week.35 Th e accreditor insisted that 12 hours was the 
maximum acceptable load, so the school solved the problem by consolidating class sections. 
Instead of the relatively small classes students had come to expect, especially in freshman and 
sophomore courses, aft er the accreditation, students oft en found themselves in classes of sixty 
or more. 
Accreditors’ recipe for educational inputs oft en includes the idea that colleges should 
employ individuals who hold “appropriate degrees.” Th e Southern Association, for example, 
states that “when determining acceptable qualifi cations of its faculty, an institution gives 
primary consideration to the highest earned degree in the discipline.”36 Th e assumption is that 
a Ph.D. trumps all other qualifi cations. Th e diffi  culty with such a one-size-fi ts-all standard is 
that it rules out the employment of individuals who may be very knowledgeable in a fi eld and 
perfectly capable of teaching, but who don’t possess the preferred credential.
People can and do gain knowledge outside of graduate schools. Some best-selling histori-
ans would be wonderful history instructors but do not have advanced degrees. Many writers 
are good at teaching literature, regardless of their academic credentials. Th ere are exemplary 
economists who never earned a Ph.D. in economics. Following accreditors’ imperatives, 
schools are encouraged to rank the possession of certain credentials above other aspects of in-
dividual ability and achievement. Restricting hiring to individuals with these credentials may 
not lead to better teaching, but is virtually guaranteed to drive up costs. 
As outlined in stories from the front lines, accreditors sometimes insist that the college’s 
academic goals be subordinated to the accreditors’ own social vision. Th ey seek to impose 
certain admissions and personnel policies or insist on politicized criteria that compromise the 
educational process. 
Such requirements are diffi  cult to reconcile with academic excellence, academic freedom, 
and diversity among institutions. Th ey are also highly questionable since they give unaccount-
able accreditors the power to impose policies which undermine rather than enhance educa-
tional quality and distinctiveness. 
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WHY ACCREDITATION DOESN’T WORK
In perhaps the most-publicized instance of such a confl ict, Th omas Aquinas College was 
threatened some years ago with a loss of accreditation due to the fact that its avowedly Catho-
lic, traditional orientation simply had no room for courses that its accreditor, the Western As-
sociation, was prescribing at the time. Th e “Great Books” curriculum at Th omas Aquinas was 
the very key to the school’s mission—so much so that there were no elective courses at all. 
Th e WASC standards that threatened small Th omas Aquinas College also were unaccept-
able to several of the most prestigious universities in California. Th e standards were de-
nounced by the president of Stanford University, who said that such tight accrediting controls 
“would ruin a system of higher education that allows Stanford and Th omas Aquinas College 
to serve students of diff erent tastes.”37 In a letter to WASC, Stanford’s then-president Gerhard 
Casper argued that the Commission was “attempting to insert itself in an area in which it has 
no legitimate standing.”38 In the face of such criticism, WASC subsequently voted to soft en, 
though not eliminate, the controversial standards.
In the 1990s, controversy over accreditors’ mandating greater diversity in the student body, 
faculty and curriculum again reared its head. Th e Middle States Association threatened to 
withdraw accreditation from Baruch College because it had only 18% minority representa-
tion on its faculty and Westminster Seminary because there were no women on its governing 
board. Th en Education Secretary Lamar Alexander concluded that it was not appropriate for 
an accreditation agency to wield what amounted to federal power in a manner that threatened 
academic freedom and diversity among institutions.39 Writing that “I did not know that it was 
the job of an accrediting agency to defi ne for a university what its diversity ought to be,” Secre-
tary Alexander chose to defer recognition of Middle States pending a report from NACIQI.40 
Th en chairman of NACIQI, the late Dr. Martin Trow, asked, “Who sets the agenda on the 
campus? Th e accrediting agency may be coming on campus as one of the contending forces.”41 
NACIQI recommended that Middle States’ recognition be extended for one year provided that 
it not deny accreditation to any institution based on diversity issues. 
Given these high-profi le cases and high-profi le dissatisfaction, accreditors laid low. But the 
problem has not disappeared. In the last year alone, two highly-publicized cases have called 
accreditors to account for engaging in questionable and prescriptive practices that undermine 
institutional quality. Th ese and other stories from the front lines are highlighted in the early 
pages of this paper. 
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WHY ACCREDITATION DOESN’T WORK
Accreditation contributes to ever-mounting education costs.
If accreditation does little to ensure quality, it does even less to address the other major worry 
about higher education—its outrageous price tag. College tuition, fees, and other expenses 
have been rising faster than the rate of infl ation for more than 25 years, but cost control is not 
among the accreditors’ concerns. 
In fact accreditation itself helps to infl ate the cost of higher education. Th e regional accred-
itors charge schools for conducting campus visits and reviews of the self-study documents, 
and schools can incur expensive direct and in-kind expenditures.42 But that’s not the only cost.
Abiding by accreditors’ one-size-fi ts-all formulae also drives up costs. Having to meet a 
particular standard for library size, for example, may do nothing to help students learn, but 
diverts resources from other institutional needs that the school may regard as more pressing. 
As former chancellor Alan E. Guskin of Antioch College explained: 
It is these [accreditor] definitions of  quality that have led to…the proliferation 
of  disciplinary programs based on the interests of  faculty members and to 
the significant increase in expenses for student support services. We are so 
wedded to a definition of  quality based on resources that we find it extremely 
difficult to deal with the results of  our work, namely student learning.43 
Institutions also incur opportunity costs when school resources are diverted from other 
tasks in preparation for accreditation reviews. And there can be costs when institutions are 
driven to implement accreditors’ recommendations rather than using their own judgment on 
how best to provide the education their students need. Former University of Missouri presi-
dent Peter Magrath recalls an episode when the accreditation committee of the American Bar 
Association insisted that the university’s law school needed a new building. “Th e problem,” 
according to Magrath, “was that you had people making decisions about the use of university 
resources who didn’t have an overall perspective.”44 Accreditors forget that there are inevitable 
trade-off s and complexities that they cannot see.
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WHY ACCREDITATION DOESN’T WORK
Accreditation creates an unaccountable, federally-mandated monopoly. 
America’s accreditation system emerged in the late 19th century as a voluntary system for 
serious educational institutions to diff erentiate themselves from institutions that were “col-
leges” in name only. Th ere was a competition among the private accrediting organizations that 
enabled market forces to maintain a necessary level of quality. Th e knowledge that institutions 
could drop accreditation kept associations from becoming dictatorial or attempting inappro-
priately to infl uence the content of education. 
Accreditation remained voluntary until 1952 when Congress linked eligibility for federal 
student aid funds to accreditation in the GI Bill. Th e power of the accrediting associations 
was further augmented by the 1965 Higher Education Act which created new student aid 
programs for non-veterans. Because this happened at a time when the importance of student 
aid in college budgets was growing, accreditation changed from a voluntary service to a nearly 
universal obligatory review. 
Since students who attend unaccredited colleges are ineligible for federal student aid, a 
loss of or failure to receive “accredited” status would be a death knell for many institutions. 
Accordingly, schools pay close attention to the criteria for certifi cation established by their 
accrediting associations and are usually quick to respond to any “concerns” expressed in an 
accreditation review. 
Six regional associations provide accrediting services for almost all colleges and uni-
versities. Each is named aft er the region of the country in which it operates: Middle States, 
Southern, North Central, Western, Northwest, and New England. Each is a private, nonprofi t 
membership association. Specialized education programs, such as in law, medicine, teaching, 
and social work are accredited by professional organizations like the American Bar Associa-
tion, Council on Social Work Education, and National Council for Accreditation of Teacher 
Education.
Accreditors do not sell their services in competition with other fi rms. Instead, they oper-
ate as regional monopolies. As such, they have nearly unchecked power—oft en making the 
accreditation process a high-wire act for schools. Indeed, accreditors are “private” in name 
only since their power derives solely from their role as gatekeepers for the federal student loan 
program. 
 Accreditors also present colleges and universities with a labyrinth of standards. A school 
that needs or seeks multiple accreditor approvals may be faced with a medley of inconsistent 
and uncoordinated standards. Th e direct result—intended or not—is to make it more diffi  cult 
and more costly for institutions to enter the higher education marketplace. 
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WHY ACCREDITATION DOESN’T WORK
Accreditation is largely a secret process.
From the vantage point of parents, students and even policymakers, accreditation is largely a 
secret process. Accreditation associations do not publish their evaluations of colleges and uni-
versities. Th e associations do publish lists of their members and any sanctions that they have 
imposed on schools. But this is scant information. 
Although for many prospective students, knowledge about the quality of an academic 
department could be very useful, accreditation off ers no such guarantee. Accrediting associa-
tions do not publish any rankings of institutions, nor do they evaluate individual programs 
and departments. Th e New England Association asserts that, “Meeting the standards does not 
guarantee the quality of individual programs, courses, or graduates….” 45 Th at admission is 
extremely important. 
As was outlined in our fi rst story from the front lines, it is possible for a college or 
university to be accredited and yet have one or more academic departments that are weak or 
dysfunctional. But that fact, even if it were noticed, would not typically be made public. 
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WHY ACCREDITATION DOESN’T WORK
Accreditation is a confl icted, closed, and clubby system. 
Federal accreditation creates serious confl icts of interest. When colleges and universities seek 
accreditation, they are being evaluated by an association of which they themselves are mem-
bers. Th ey pay annual dues and an accreditation fee to this association. Th e fact that accredita-
tion is rarely denied or revoked may be explained, at least in part, by the reluctance of accredi-
tors to cast off  paying members.
Th e accreditation review process is also a closed, clubby system. Th e accreditation teams 
that visit and evaluate schools are generally composed of college and university personnel 
from other schools in the region, people whose own schools will be evaluated by a team that 
might include someone from the school under evaluation. It is not surprising that this system 
produces little valuable information because accreditation agencies do not see themselves in 
an adversarial relationship with their members. 
Th e desire to maintain collegiality and not to lose paying association members raises con-
fl ict of interest issues that make the regional accreditors questionable gatekeepers for eligibility 
for federal funds.
Accrediting agencies might undergo dramatic change or disappear entirely if it were not 
for the federal law that guarantees them a customer base. Subjecting the accreditation associa-
tions to marketplace competition would lead to better results.
17
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WHAT POLICYMAKERS CAN DO
WHAT POLICYMAKERS CAN DO
As we have seen, the system of accreditation that has evolved in the United States does not 
serve to assure educational excellence or even competence. Th ough accreditation is nearly 
universal, study aft er study shows a troubling decline in academic quality. Th e current system 
does little or nothing to screen out institutions that have succumbed to the temptation to keep 
students content with low standards and a weak curriculum. 
ACTA calls on policymakers to take action now:
Break the link between federal student aid and accreditation. 
Th e reason for linking the two at the time of the GI Bill was to protect against the squander-
ing of federal funds on institutions that provided an education in name only. Experience has 
shown, however, that many accredited institutions now provide an education in name only. 
If accreditation ever served as a reliable proxy for acceptable educational quality, it no longer 
does.
Independent of the accreditation process, the Department of Education already determines 
what Congress needs to know—institutional fi nancial responsibility. Existing regulations re-
quire that institutions submit audits every year and maintain good-standing with the Depart-
ment in order to participate in Title IV programs.46  Th ese reviews ensure that student loan 
funds are expended on fi nancially responsible institutions and provide consumer protection, 
without the shortcomings of federal accreditation. 
Parents and students today have access to more information than ever before on the qual-
ity of education—books, magazines and especially on the Internet—enabling them to make 
informed decisions based on far more than the minimal amount of information conveyed 
by the accreditation system. Th e self-interest of students and parents reduces the problem of 
fraudulently low-quality education to one of de minimis proportions. If there were instances of 
educational fraud by institutions receiving federal funds, it would be better policy to ban them 
from receiving federal funds for a period of years than to compel all to participate in an ac-
creditation system that has more cost than benefi t. Th at is the approach the government takes 
with the Food Stamp program. Rather than trying to limit Food Stamp use to approved stores, 
the government simply prosecutes cases of fraud.
A similar approach to accreditation makes sense.
Make accreditors prove their worth. 
If the federal government repealed the restriction against using student aid money at non-
accredited colleges and universities, the accreditation system would no longer be guaranteed 
a market for its services. Accreditors would have to pass the test of the market—i.e., earn 
enough in voluntary payments to cover all of their operating costs. Former Boston University 
president Jon Westling summed up the benefi ts of opening up a free market in accreditation:
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WHAT POLICYMAKERS CAN DO
Accreditation agencies should be, in effect, accredited by their customers. If  
they have anything worthwhile to offer colleges and universities, colleges and 
universities will pay them for it. Generally, colleges and universities will pay to 
be reviewed by the agency which has the strictest standards that the institu-
tion thinks it can pass. A free market in accreditation agencies will quickly 
stratify, with the toughest agencies attracting the best colleges and universi-
ties. The public will benefit from a genuine ranking system.47
Accreditation associations should start acting in a manner more akin to business consul-
tants than monopolies.
 
Break the accreditor monopoly. 
Th e traditional division of the country into regions that are the sole province of one accredit-
ing association makes no sense today, if it ever did. Th e Department of Education and state 
governments should require colleges and universities to solicit bids for accrediting services, 
just as they do for other services. It is of course possible that only the historic, regional ac-
creditor would submit a bid. But competition is a powerful force and even nonprofi t institu-
tions like to grow. Th e prospect of getting contracts may overcome traditional boundaries and 
perhaps draw new accreditors into the fi eld. 
An objection to required bidding might be that universities would be able to seek out ac-
creditors with low costs and low standards. But accreditation standards have already fallen to 
the lowest common denominator. Instead of causing a “race to the bottom,” competition in 
accreditation would likely do the opposite. Schools that wanted to diff erentiate themselves by 
virtue of their high standards, serious teaching, sound curriculum and so forth might seek 
out selective accreditors whose certifi cation would be a mark of distinction. Competition in 
this fi eld can only lead to improvement. Th e states could also seek federal waivers of the law 
requiring accreditation by a federally recognized accrediting agency (as was done with regard 
to welfare reform), then devise their own mechanisms for ensuring the educational quality of 
their institutions.
49Conclusion
Ensure student achievement. 
Parents and students deserve to know whether an institution successfully teaches its students. 
But accreditation has tended to focus chiefl y on educational inputs, while paying little atten-
tion to educational results. Th at approach has obscured the fact that educational standards 
have been in sharp decline at many colleges and universities. Th e Commission on the Future 
of Higher Education has called on colleges and universities to “make aggregate summary 
results of all postsecondary learning measures, e.g., test scores, certifi cation and licensure at-
tainment, time to degree, graduation rates, and other relevant measures, publicly available in a 
consumer-friendly form as a condition of accreditation.”48 
Knowing which schools stand out for their commitment to excellence would be valuable 
information. How best to ensure excellence will not be the same for all schools, and suggest-
ing the best means of assessment might become an area of expertise for accrediting agencies, 
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WHAT POLICYMAKERS CAN DO
much as energy consultants tell business clients not only whether they are using energy ef-
fi ciently, but how to reach optimal effi  ciency. Any results from learning assessments should be 
shared with the public.
Tell the public what it deserves to know. 
As things now stand, poor accrediting evaluations can be hidden. Th e historic collegiality 
between accrediting associations and their members has resulted in a system that is virtually 
unknown to the public. Institutions would be more apt to prevent serious weaknesses from 
developing, especially academic ones, if they knew that they would be exposed to public scru-
tiny.
Stop the homogenization of higher education. 
Some accrediting associations have adopted biased and intrusive review criteria that infringe 
upon institutional autonomy and self-governance. Th e ultimate result has been the homog-
enization of American higher education. Th ere is no proof that educational quality depends 
on particular student dispositions, institutional governance practices, or specifi c personnel 
policies. Such requirements only reduce overall diversity.
Th is intrusion may in part be due to legislative language that gives accreditors the ability 
to adopt “any additional standards not provided for.” Accreditors are free to impose standards 
that go beyond those Congress has mandated, using their leverage to push institutions toward 
any agenda they wish. 
Congress should end that power and the relationship between accreditors and institutional 
leaders should be clarifi ed so there is no confusion. 
Boards of trustees have the ultimate responsibility for overseeing all aspects of an institu-
tion’s functions. At public institutions, many trustees have been appointed by the governor or 
legislators to make sure that the college or university is serving citizens well. It is not the role 
of an accrediting agency to interfere with trustees’ responsibilities. 
Create a consumer-friendly expedited alternative for reaccreditation. 
For federal purposes, a school is accredited unless and until its accreditation is removed. 
While accreditors typically require institutions to return for review every 10 years, there is 
no such requirement in the law. Congress should establish an “Expedited Reaccreditation” 
program that allows already-accredited institutions to certify key information about cost, 
academic quality and student achievement—in lieu of an accreditation review. 
 Under expedited reaccreditation, institutions are off ered an alternative to the existing 
accreditation process. Any college that selected the alternative would submit certain key data 
addressing institutional practices—that would be available to the consumer. 
No specifi c outcomes would be mandated: Schools would simply be required to report on 
key measurements relating to quality in keeping with the recommendations of the Commis-
sion on the Future of Higher Education.
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WHAT POLICYMAKERS CAN DO
Any college that chose the expedited reaccreditation alternative once would fi nd it very 
easy to do it again since appropriate data collection systems already would be in place. Th e 
information, meanwhile, would be accessible to students and parents, and reported publicly 
to provide consumers and policymakers with a way to examine the eff ectiveness of diff erent 
colleges and universities. 
 Expedited accreditation would not be available to institutions whose accreditation had 
been revoked, suspended or put on probation, or whose fundamental structure or purpose 
were changed. Th e institution would continue to have the option to follow the existing ac-
creditation process. 
Don’t replicate a failed model. 
Policymakers should not apply this failed model to other non-profi t institutions, such as pri-
vate foundations. Federal accreditation reduces diversity and encourages bureaucratic intru-
sion and costly intervention without measurable benefi t. 
State legislators should also be wary of conditioning state approvals or benefi ts on federal 
accreditation. 
Reduce the cost of higher education. 
By eliminating the cost of federally mandated accreditation, Congress can give institutions the 
freedom to use their own best judgment on how best to carry out their educational 
objectives. 
Accreditors may well fi nd that they can enhance their value to schools if they develop ex-
pertise in fi nding ways to contain or reduce costs. While campuses frequently hire consultants 
to fi nd effi  ciencies that aff ect the institution’s bottom line, students and parents might benefi t 
from recommendations on ways to reduce the costs of textbooks, housing, and the many 
other staples of education. Accreditors that can help to control costs would have a competitive 
advantage over those that cannot.
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